Digital forensics investigations of IoT using electromagnetic side channels

From CERES
Revision as of 14:33, 30 September 2019 by Axelsson (Talk | contribs)

(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to: navigation, search
Title Digital forensics investigations of IoT using electromagnetic side channels
Summary Use electromagnetic leakage from IoT devices to determine what software they're running
Keywords electronics, computer architecture, security
TimeFrame spring
References http://dfrws.org/conferences/dfrws-usa-2019/sessions/leveraging-electromagnetic-side-channel-analysis-investigation
Prerequisites electronics, electromagnetic field theory, physics, security
Author Stefan Axelsson
Supervisor Stefan Axelsson, Mark Dougherty, Mohamed Eldefrawy
Level Master
Status Open

Generate PDF template

When computers run, they give rise to electromagnetic radiation that can be picked up by a nearby probe. It has long been known that this EM radiation can leak information about what the computer is doing, even up to the point of being able to determine (with statistical certainty) a particular cryptographic key that is in use.

However, in digital forensics to come, police will arrive at a crime scene and not even know what devices are present, and what bearing that could have on the case. This due to IoT devices, which will probably be scattered around the landscape. Thus finding, and determining what these devices are doing is valuable from a crime fighting perspective. Determining whether the firmware an IoT device is running is the original, or has been hacked would be useful.

We have already started work in this field, first by trying to replicate previous results, but there are many obvious new ways of taking this research, which particular ones are upp for discussion. As this is an area of current research here at Halmstad, we would aim for a result that is publishable.